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1 Introduction
In recent years, we have witnessed the growth of a number of theories of uncertainty,
where imprecise (lower and upper) probabilities, or probability intervals, rather than
precise (or point-valued) probabilities, have a central part. Here we consider two of
them, Peter Walley’s behavioural theory [8], and Glenn Shafer and Vladimir Vovk’s
game-theoretic account of probability [7]. These seem to have a completely different
interpretation, and they certainly stem from quite different schools of thought: Walley
follows the tradition of Frank Ramsey [6], Bruno de Finetti [3] and Peter Williams
[10] in trying to establish a rational model for a subject’s beliefs in terms of her be-
haviour. Shafer and Vovk follow an approach that has many other influences as well,
and is strongly coloured by ideas about gambling systems and martingales. They use
Cournot’s bridge to interpret lower and upper probabilities (see [7, Chapter 2] for a nice
historical overview), whereas on Walley’s approach, lower and upper probabilities are
defined in terms of a subject’s betting rates.
What we set out to do here, is show that in many practical situations, both ap-
proaches are very strongly connected. This means that results, valid in one theory, can
automatically be converted and reinterpreted in terms of the other.
2 Shafer and Vovk’s game-theoretic approach to probability
In their game-theoretic approach to probability [7], Shafer and Vovk consider a game
with two players, World and Skeptic, who play according to a certain protocol. They
obtain the most interesting results for a special type of protocol, called a coherent prob-
ability protocol. This section is devoted to explaining what this means.
G1. The first player, World, can make a number of moves, where the possible next
moves may depend on the previous moves he has made, but do not in any way
depend on the previous moves made by Skeptic.
This means that we can represent his game-play by a (decision) tree. We restrict our-
selves here to the discussion of bounded protocols, where World can only make a finite
and bounded number of moves, whatever happens. But we do not exclude the possibil-
ity that at some point in the tree, World has the choice between an infinite number of
next moves.
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Fig. 1. A simple decision tree for World, displaying the initial situation , other non-final situa-
tions (such as t) as grey circles, and paths, or final situations, (such as ω) as black circles. Also
depicted is a cut of , consisting of the situations u1, . . . , u4.
Let us establish some terminology related to World’s decision tree. A path in the
tree represents a possible sequence of moves for World from the beginning to the end
of the game. We denote the set of all possible paths ω by Ω, the sample space of the
game. A situation t is some connected segment of a path that is initial, i.e., starts at
the root of the tree. It identifies the decisions or moves World has made up to a certain
point. We denote the set of all situations by Ω♦. It includes the set Ω of final situations,
or paths. All other situations are called non-final; among them is the initial situation
, which represents the empty initial segment. See Figure 1 for a graphical example
explaining these notions.
World’s move space in a non-final situation t is the set Wt of those moves w that
World can make in t:Wt =
{
w : tw ∈Ω♦}.
If for two situations s and t, s is an (initial) segment of t, then we say that s precedes
t or that t follows s, and write sv t. If ω is a path and t v ω then we say that the path ω
goes through situation t. We write s@ t if sv t and s 6= t.
A function on Ω♦ is called a process, and a partial process whose domain includes
all situations that follow a situation t is called a t-process. Similarly, a function on Ω
is called a variable, and a partial variable on Ω whose domain includes all paths that
go through a situation t is called a t-variable. If we restrict a t-process F to the final
situations that follow t, we obtain a t-variable, which we denote by FΩ.
We now turn to the other player, Skeptic. His moves may be influenced by the
previous moves that World has made, in the following sense. In each situation t, he has
a set St of moves s available to him, called Skeptic’s move space in t.
G2. In each non-final situation t, there is a (positive or negative) gain for Skeptic as-
sociated with each of the possible moves s in St that World can make. This gain
depends only on the situation t and the next move w that World will make.
This means that for each non-final situation t there is a gain function λt : St ×Wt → R,
such that λt(s,w) represents the change in Skeptic’s capital in situation t when he makes
move s and World makes move w.
Let us introduce some further notions and terminology related to Skeptic’s game-
play. A strategy P for Skeptic is a partial process defined on the set Ω♦ \Ω of non-final
situations, such that P (t) ∈ St is the move that Skeptic will make in each non-final
situation t. With each such strategy P there corresponds a capital process K P , whose
value in each situation t gives us Skeptic’s capital accumulated so far, when he starts
out with zero capital and plays according to the strategy P . It is given by the recursion
relation
K P (tw) =K P (t)+λt(P (t),w),
with initial conditionK P () = 0. Of course, when Skeptic starts out (in) with capital
α and uses strategy P , his corresponding accumulated capital is given by the process
α+K P . In the final situations, his accumulated capital is then given by the variable
α+K PΩ .
If we start in a non-final situation t, rather than in , then we can consider t-
strategies P that tell Skeptic how to move starting from t, and the corresponding capital
process K P is then also a t-process, that tells us how much capital Skeptic has accumu-
lated since starting with zero capital in situation t and using t-strategy P .
Assumptions G1 and G2 determine so-called gambling protocols. They are suffi-
cient for us to be able to define upper and lower prices for variables. Consider a non-
final situation t and a t-variable f . Then the upper price Et( f ) for f in t is defined as
the infimum capital α that Skeptic has to start out with in t in order that there would be
some t-strategy P such that his accumulated capital α+K P allows him, at the end of
the game, to buy f , whatever moves World makes after t:
Et( f ) := inf
{
α : there is some t-strategy P such that α+K PΩ ≥ f
}
, (1)
where α+K PΩ ≥ f is taken to mean that α+K P (ω) ≥ f (ω) for all final situations ω
that go through t. Similarly, for the lower price Et( f ) for f in t:
Et( f ) := sup
{
α : there is some t-strategy P such that α−K PΩ ≤ f
}
,
so Et( f ) = −Et(− f ). If we start from the initial situation t = , we simply get the
upper and lower prices for a variable f , which we also denote by E( f ) and E( f ).
A gambling protocol is called a probability protocol when besides S1 and S2, two
more requirements are satisfied.
P1. For each non-final situation t, Skeptic’s move space St is a convex cone in some
linear space: a1s1+ a2s2 ∈ St for all non-negative real numbers a1 and a2 and all
s1 and s2 in St .
P2. For each non-final situation t, Skeptic’s gain function λt has the following linearity
property: λt(a1s1 + a2s2,w) = a1λt(s1,w)+ a2λt(s2,w) for all non-negative real
numbers a1 and a2, all s1 and s2 in St and all w inWt .
Finally, a probability protocol is called coherent when moreover
C. For each non-final situation t, and for each s in St there is some w in Wt such that
λt(s,w)≤ 0.
It is clear what this requirement means: for each non-final situation, World has a strategy
for playing from t onwards such that Skeptic cannot (strictly) increase his capital from
t onwards, whatever t-strategy he uses.
For such coherent probability protocols, Shafer and Vovk prove a number of inter-
esting properties for the corresponding upper (and lower) prices. We list a number of
them here. Call a cut U of a non-final situation t any set of situations that (i) follow t,
and (ii) such that for all paths ω through t [t v ω], there is a unique u ∈U such that
ω goes through u [u v ω]; see also Figure 1. For any t-variable f , we can associate
with such a cut U another special t-variable EU by EU ( f )(ω) = Eu( f ), for all paths
ω through t, where u is the unique situation in U that ω goes through. For any two
t-variables f1 and f2, f1 ≤ f2 is taken to mean that f1(ω) ≤ f2(ω) for all paths ω that
go through t.
Proposition 1 (Properties of prices in a coherent probability protocol [7]). Con-
sider a coherent probability protocol, let t be a non-final situation, f , f1 and f2 t-
variables, and U a cut of t. Then
1. inf{ f (ω) : ω ∈Ω, t v ω}≤Et( f )≤Et( f )≤ sup{ f (ω) : ω ∈Ω, t v ω} [positivity];
2. Et( f1+ f2)≤ Et( f1)+Et( f2) [sub-additivity];
3. Et(λ f ) = λEt( f ) for all real λ≥ 0 [non-negative homogeneity];
4. Et( f +α) = Et( f )+α for all real α [constant additivity];
5. Et(α) = α for all real α [normalisation];
6. f1 ≤ f2 implies that Et( f1)≤ Et( f2) [monotonicity];
7. Et( f ) = Et(EU ( f )) [law of iterated expectation].
What is more, Shafer and Vovk use specific instances of such coherent probability pro-
tocols to prove various limit theorems (such as the law of large numbers, the central
limit theorem, the law of the iterated logarithm), from which they can derive the well-
known measure-theoretic versions. We shall come back to this in Section 5.
3 Walley’s behavioural approach to probability
In his book on the behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities [8], Walley considers
many different types of related models. We shall restrict ourselves here to the most
general and most powerful one, which also turns out to be the easiest to explain, namely
coherent sets of desirable gambles; see also [9].
Consider a non-empty set Ω of possible alternatives ω, only one which actually
obtains (or will obtain); we assume that it is possible, at least in principle, to determine
which alternative does so. Also consider a subject who is uncertain about which possible
alternative actually obtains (or will obtain). A gamble on Ω is a real-valued function on
Ω, and it is interpreted as an uncertain reward, expressed in units of some predetermined
linear utility scale: if ω actually obtains, then the reward is f (ω), which may be positive
or negative. If a subject accepts a gamble f , this means that she is willing to engage in
the transaction, where (i) first it is determined whichω obtains, and then (ii) she receives
the reward f (ω). We can try and model the subject’s beliefs about Ω by considering
which gambles she accepts.
Suppose our subject specifies some set D of gambles she accepts, called a set of
desirable gambles. Such a set is called coherent if it satisfies the following rationality
requirements:
D1. if f < 0 then f 6∈D [avoiding partial loss];
D2. if f ≥ 0 then f ∈D [accepting partial gain];
D3. if f1 and f2 belong to D then their (point-wise) sum f1 + f2 also belongs to D
[combination];
D4. if f belongs to D then its (point-wise) scalar product λ f also belongs to D for all
non-negative real numbers λ [scaling].
Here ‘ f < 0’ means ‘ f ≤ 0 and not f = 0’. Walley has also argued that sets of desirable
gambles should satisfy an additional axiom:
D5. D is B-conglomerable for any partition B ofΩ: if IB f ∈D for all B ∈B , then also
f ∈ B [full conglomerability].
Full conglomerability is a very strong requirement, and it is not without controversy. If
a model D is B-conglomerable, this means that certain inconsistency problems when
conditioning on elements B of B are avoided; see [8] for more details. Conglomerability
of belief models was not required by forerunners of Walley, such as Williams [10], or de
Finetti [3]. While I agree with Walley that conglomerability is a desirable property for
sets of desirable gambles, I do not believe that full conglomerability is always necessary:
it seems that we need only require conglomerability with respect to those partitions that
we actually intend to condition our model on. This is the path I shall follow in Section 4.
Given a coherent set of desirable gambles, we can define conditional upper and
lower previsions as follows: for any gamble f and any non-empty subset B of Ω, with
indicator IB,
P( f |B) := inf{α : IB(α− f ) ∈D}
P( f |B) := sup{α : IB( f −α) ∈D}
so P( f |B) = −P(− f |B), and P( f |B) is the infimum price α for which the subject will
sell the gamble f , i.e., accept the gamble α− f , contingent on the occurrence of B. For
any event A, we define the conditional lower probability P(A|B) := P(IA|B), i.e., the
subject’s supremum rate for betting on the event A, contingent on the occurrence of B,
and similarly for P(A|B) := P(IA|B).
If B is a partition of Ω, then we define P( f |B) as the gamble that in any element ω
of Ω assumes the value P( f |B), where B is the unique element of B such that ω ∈ B.
The following properties of conditional upper and lower previsions associated with
a coherent set of desirable gambles were (essentially) proven by Walley.
Proposition 2 (Properties of conditional upper and lower previsions [8]). Consider
a coherent set of desirable gambles, let B be any non-empty subset of Ω, f , f1 and f2
gambles on Ω,. Then1
1 Here, as in Proposition 1, we assume that whatever we write down is well-defined, meaning
that for instance no sums of −∞ and +∞ appear, and that the function P(·|B) is real-valued,
and nowhere infinite. Shafer and Vovk do not seem to mention this.
1. inf{ f (ω) : ω ∈ B} ≤ P( f |B)≤ P( f |B)≤ sup{ f (ω) : ω ∈ B} [positivity];
2. P( f1+ f2|B)≤ P( f1|B)+P( f2|B) [sub-additivity];
3. P(λ f |B) = λP( f |B) for all real λ≥ 0 [non-negative homogeneity];
4. P( f +α|B) = P( f |B)+α for all real α [constant additivity];
5. P(α|B) = α for all real α [normalisation];
6. f1 ≤ f2 implies that P( f1|B)≤ P( f2|B) [monotonicity];
7. if B is a partition of Ω that refines the partition {B,Bc} and D is B-conglomerable,
then P( f |B)≤ P(P( f |B)|B) [conglomerative property].
The analogy between Propositions 1 and 2 is too striking to be coincidental. The fact
that there is an equality in Proposition 1.7, where we have only an inequality in Propo-
sitions 2.7, seems to indicate moreover that Shafer and Vovk’s approach leads to a less
general type of model.2 We now set out to identify the exact correspondence between
the two models.
4 Connecting the two approaches
In order to lay bare the connections between the game-theoretic and the behavioural ap-
proach, we enter Shafer and Vovk’s world, and consider another player, called Subject,
who has certain piece-wise beliefs about what moves World will make.
More specifically, for each non-final situation t ∈ Ω♦ \Ω, she has beliefs about
which move w World will choose next from the set Wt of moves available to him in t.
We suppose she represents those beliefs in the form of a coherent3 set Dt of desirable
gambles onWt . These beliefs are conditional, in the sense that they represent Subject’s
beliefs about what World will do immediately after he gets to situation t. We call any
specification of such coherent Dt , t ∈ Ω♦ \Ω, a coherent conditional assessment for
Subject.
We can now ask ourselves what the behavioural implications of these conditional
assessments are. For instance, what do they tell us about whether or not Subject should
accept certain gambles on Ω, the set of possible paths for World? In other words, how
can these beliefs about which next move World will make in each non-final situation t
be combined rationally into beliefs about World’s complete sequence of moves?
In order to investigate this, we use Walley’s very general and powerful method of
natural extension, which is just conservative coherent reasoning. We shall construct,
using the pieces of information Dt , a set of desirable gambles on Ω that is (i) coherent,
and (ii) as small as possible, meaning that no more gambles should be accepted than is
actually required by coherence.
First, we collect the pieces. Consider any non-final situation t ∈ Ω♦ \Ω and any
gamble ht in Dt . Just as for variables, we can define a t-gamble as a partial gamble
2 This also shows that the claim on p. 186 in [7] to the effect that “[de Finetti, Williams and
Walley] also considered the relation between unconditional and conditional prices, but they
were not working in an dynamic framework and so did not formulate [Shafer and Vovk’s
equivalent of our Proposition 1.7]”, at least needs some qualification.
3 Since we do not envisage conditioning this model on subsets of Wt , we impose no extra con-
glomerability requirements here, only the coherence conditions D1–D4.
whose domain contains all pathsω that go through t. Then with each ht we can associate
a t-gamble, also denoted by ht , and defined by
ht(ω) := ht(ω(t)),
for all t v ω, where we denote by ω(t) the unique element of Wt such that tω(t) v ω.
If we consider the set ↑t := {ω ∈Ω : t v ω} of all paths that go through t, then I↑tht
represents the gamble on Ω that is called off unless World ends up in situation t, and
which, when it is not called off, depends only on World’s move immediately after t,
and gives the same value ht(w) to all paths ω that go through tw. The fact that Subject
accepts ht on Wt contingent on World’s getting to t, translates immediately to the fact
that Subject accepts the gamble I↑tht on Ω. We thus end up with a set of gambles on Ω
D :=
[
t∈Ω♦\Ω
{
I↑tht : ht ∈Dt
}
that Subject accepts. The only thing left to do now, is to find the smallest coherent set
ED of desirable gambles that includes D (if there is such a coherent set). Here we take
coherence to refer to conditions D1–D4, together with D5’, a variation on D5 which
refers to conglomerability with respect to those partitions that we actually intend to
condition on, as discussed in Section 3.
These partitions are what we call cut partitions. Consider any non-final cut U ⊆
Ω♦ \Ω of the initial situation. Then the set of events BU := {↑u : u ∈U} is a partition
of Ω, called the U-partition. D5’ requires that our set of desirable gambles should be
cut conglomerable, i.e., conglomerable with respect to every cut partition BU .
Because we require cut conglomerability, it follows that ED will contain the sums
of gambles ∑u∈U I↑uhu for all non-final cuts U of  and all choices of hu ∈Du, u ∈U .
BecauseED should be a convex cone [by D3 and D4], any sum of such sums∑u∈U I↑uhu
over a finite number of non-final cutsU should also belong to ED . But, since in the case
of bounded protocols we are discussing here, World can only make a bounded and finite
number of moves,Ω♦ \Ω is a finite union of such non-final cuts, and therefore the sums
∑u∈Ω♦\Ω I↑uhu should belong to ED for all choices hu ∈Du, u ∈Ω♦ \Ω.
Call therefore, for any initial situation t, a t-selection any partial process S defined
on the non-final situations s w t such that S(s) ∈ Ds. With such a t-selection, we can
associate a t-process, called a gamble process GS , with value
GS (s) = ∑
tvu,u@s
I↑uS(u)(s(u))
in all situations s that follow t. Alternatively, GS is given by the recursion relation
GS (sw) = GS (s) + S(s)(w) for all non-final s w t, with initial value GS (t) = 0. In
particular, this leads to the t-gamble GSΩ defined on all final situations ω that follow t,
by letting
GSΩ = ∑
tvu,u∈Ω♦\Ω
I↑uS(u).
Then we have just shown that the gambles GSΩ should belong to ED for all non-final
situations t and all t-selections S . As before for strategy and capital processes, we call
a -selection S simply a selection, and a -gamble process simple a gamble process.
It is now but a small step to prove the following result.
Proposition 3. The smallest set of gambles that satisfies D1–D4 and D5’ and includes
D , or in other words, the natural extension of D , is given by
ED :=
{
g : there is some selection S such that g≥ GSΩ
}
.
Moreover, for any non-final situation t and any t-gamble g, we have that I↑tg ∈ ED if
and only if g ≥ GSΩ for some t-selection S , where as before, g ≥ GSΩ is taken to mean
that g(ω)≥ GSΩ(ω) for all final situations ω that follow t.
We now use the coherent set of desirable gambles ED to define upper (and lower)
previsions conditional on the cut partitions BU as indicated in Section 3. We then get,
using Proposition 3, that for any cutU of  and any situation u inU :
P( f |↑u) := inf{α : I↑u(α− f ) ∈ ED}
= inf
{
α : there is some u-selection S such that α−GSΩ ≥ f
}
. (2)
There seems to be a close correspondence between the expressions [such as (1)] for up-
per prices Et( f ) associated with coherent probability protocols and those [such as (2)]
for the conditional upper previsions P( f |↑t) based on a coherent conditional assess-
ments. This correspondence is made explicit in the following theorem. Say that a given
coherent probability protocol and given coherent conditional assessment match when-
ever they lead to identical corresponding upper prices Et and conditional upper previ-
sions P(·|↑t) for all non-final t ∈Ω♦ \Ω.
Theorem 1 (Matching Theorem). For every coherent probability protocol there is a
coherent conditional assessment such that both match, and conversely, for every co-
herent conditional assessment there is a coherent probability protocol such that both
match.
The proof of this result is quite technical, but the underlying ideas should be clear.
If we have a coherent probability protocol with move spaces St and gain functions
λt for Skeptic, define the conditional assessment for Subject to be (essentially) Dt :=
{−λ(s, ·) : s ∈ St}. If, conversely, we have a coherent conditional assessment for Sub-
ject consisting of the sets Dt , define the move spaces for Skeptic by St := Dt , and his
gain functions by λt(h, ·) :=−h for all h in Dt .
5 Interpretation
The Matching Theorem has a very interesting interpretation. In Shafer and Vovk’s ap-
proach, World is sometimes decomposed into two players, Reality and Forecaster. It
is Reality whose moves are characterised by the above-mentioned decision tree, and it
is Forecaster who determines in each non-final situation t what Skeptic’s move space
St and gain function λt is. We now go beyond Shafer and Vovk’s model, by adding
something to it.
Suppose that Forecaster has certain beliefs, in each non-final situation t, about what
move Reality will make next, and suppose she models those beliefs by specifying a
coherent set Dt of desirable gambles on Wt . In other words, we identify Forecaster
with Subject.
When Forecaster specifies such a set, she is making certain behavioural commit-
ments. In fact, she is committing herself to accepting any gamble in Dt , and to accept-
ing any combination of such gambles according to the combination axioms D3, D4 and
D5’. This implies that we can derive conditional upper previsions P(·|↑t), with the fol-
lowing interpretation: in situation t, P( f |↑) is the infimum price for which Forecaster
can be made to sell the t-gamble f for on the basis of the commitments she has made.
What Skeptic can now do, is take Forecaster up on her commitments. This means
that in each situation t, he can select a gamble (or equivalently, any non-negative linear
combination of gambles) ht in Dt and offer it to Forecaster. If Reality’s next move in
situation t is w ∈Wt , this means that Skeptic can increase his capital by (the positive
or negative amount) −ht(w), by exploiting Forecaster’s commitments. In other words,
his move space st can then be identified with the convex set of gambles Dt and his gain
function λt is then given by λt(ht , ·) =−ht . But then Theorem 1 tells us that this leads to
a coherent probability protocol, and that the corresponding upper prices Et for Skeptic
coincide with Forecaster’s conditional upper previsions P(·|↑t).
This is of particular relevance to the laws of large numbers that Shafer and Vovk
derive in their game-theoretic framework, because such laws now can be given a be-
havioural interpretation in terms of Forecaster (or any Subject’s) (conditional) lower
and upper previsions. To give an example, let us consider the following game.
FINITE-HORIZON BOUNDED FIXED LOWER FORECASTING GAME
Parameters: N, B> 0, ε> 0, α> 0
Players: Reality, Forecaster, Skeptic
Protocol: Forecaster announces m ∈ [−B,B]
K0 := α
FOR n= 1, . . . ,N:
Skeptic announces λn ≥ 0
Reality announces xn ∈ [−B,B]
Kn =Kn−1+λn(xn−m).
Winner: Skeptic wins if Kn is never negative and either KN ≥ 1 or 1N ∑Nn=1 xn <m−ε.
Otherwise Reality wins.
Then Enrique Miranda and I have proven elsewhere [1], amongst other things, that
Skeptic has a strategy that guarantees that he wins the game if he starts out with capital
α≥ exp(− Nε216B2 ). But this means that for the event
∆N,ε :=
{
(x1, . . . ,xN) :
1
N
N
∑
n=1
xn < m− ε
}
we have that E(∆N,ε) ≤ exp(− Nε216B2 ). We are now able to import this result into the
behavioural theory of imprecise probabilities, using Theorem 1. Consider a number
of bounded random variables X1, . . . , XN , where Xk ∈ [−B,B], whose values will be
revealed successively. Assume that some Subject models her beliefs about the values
that these variables assume by specifying, on beforehand, a common lower prevision m
for each of them, meaning that she accepts to buy each Xk for any price that is at least
m.4 Then coherence requires her to bet on the event that the sample mean 1N ∑
N
n=1Xk
will be at least m− ε at rates that are higher than 1− exp(− Nε216B2 ), so these rates go to
one as N increases, for any ε > 0. This is a weak law of large numbers for bounded
random variables.
6 Additional Remarks
We have proven the correspondence between the two approaches only for decision trees
with a bounded horizon. For games with infinite horizon, the correspondence becomes
less immediate, because Shafer and Vovk implicitly make use of coherence axioms
that are stronger than D1–D4 and D5’, leading to upper prices that are dominated by
the corresponding conditional upper previsions. Exact matching would be restored of
course, provided we can argue that these additional requirements are rational for any
subject to comply with. This could be an interesting topic for further research.
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